Abstract-Electronic elements of a substation control system have been recognized as critical cyberassets due to the increased complexity of the automation system that is further integrated with physical facilities. Since this can be executed by unauthorized users, the security investment of cybersystems remains one of the most important factors for substation planning and maintenance. As a result of these integrated systems, intrusion attacks can impact operations. This work systematically investigates the intrusion resilience of the ten architectures between a substation network and others. In this paper, two network architectures comparing computer-based boundary protection and firewall-dedicated virtual local-area networks are detailed, that is, architectures one and ten. A comparison on the remaining eight architecture models was performed. Mean time to compromise is used to determine the system operational period. Simulation cases have been set up with the metrics based on different levels of attackers' strength. These results as well as sensitivity analysis show that implementing certain architectures would enhance substation network security.
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I. INTRODUCTION C YBERESECURITY of electrical substations has become an important driver for network communication investments [1] . Although communication networks of power substations are generally segregated from public networks, exposure to insider threats remains. To reduce the occurrence of cyberattacks and the adverse effects on power grid reliability that stem from cyberattacks, there is an urgent need to improve security protections for substations. In addition, security analysts and power system planners synergistically gather cyberincident data to identify possible infrastructure improvements. Their collaborative efforts are important when deploying a new system or deploying additional electronic components in substations as part of automation upgrades and maintenance.
The implementation of computerized substation automation has shown a reduction in outage time and improved reliability in power systems [1] - [3] . In recent years, these critical infrastructures have undergone revolutionary changes with new standards and regulations due to a growing dependency on Internet Protocol (IP)-based communication. Substation networks can be vulnerable to electronic intrusions [4] . Traditionally segregated, simple, and proprietary networks are now evolving into more complex, widely connected, and interdependent networks [5] . Although these networks are isolated from the public domain, the implementation of IP-based communication infrastructure poses a risk for cyberintruders to gain access to the critical cyberassets [6] . Integrated reliability models with the cyberinfrastructure and connections of such an infrastructure to physical systems have been studied [7] , [8] .
New communication protocols implemented in intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), such as IEC61850, are some examples of recent advances in automation. Evaluating these technologies requires a means to quantify the security of a network [9] . Applications of IEC61850 are expanding to facilitate distributed fault localization, isolation, and supply restoration to the grid [10] . Interoperability issues between intelligent electronic devices of different manufacturers have been simulated on large-sized substations for functional testing of protection and automation [11] . While such transformation has made the interoperability between vendors possible and has provided additional functionality, for example, remote control and accessibility, the transition has also exposed substations to a larger pool of untrusted networks and individuals. An unauthorized user with sophisticated knowledge and tools can successfully penetrate substation networks and exploit security frameworks [12] - [14] . Security requirements in the form of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC-CIP) standards are regularly revised and enforced [15] , [16] . These standards have a significant impact on utilities that deploy an IP-based communication infrastructure, which includes critical cyberassets that can have the capability to control the physical facilities of the grid [17] . However, the efforts of NERC-CIP standards focus on specific security controls and auditing rather than with overall measures of security or reliability. Efforts to establish methods to assess the component and system reliability for critical cybernetworks have been limited [15] . The CIP standards specify minimum protection requirements for all substations, and compliance with CIP standards does not guarantee an adequate level of system security to critical cyberassets in the most important substations [18] . Utilities, vendors, and system integrators each continue to attempt to establish specific cases of a security deployment plan in addition to the minimum requirements.
Integrity and availability are the most important security attributes in operation networks [19] . The effectiveness of intrusion detection and prevention systems in a communication system in a substation depends on the compromise rate and remedy rate of each component in the network. In this study, each device in a proposed network architecture is associated with a compromise rate with different levels of attackers' skills. Since information of real cyberintrusions in substation networks is not publicly available, a transition rate of cybercomponents can be reasonably assumed for evaluating the entire system on its effectiveness of intrusion detection and prevention [20] . In this paper, sensitivity analysis is performed to investigate the effects on system performance with respect to attackers' strength and the setup of network architectures. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sections II-IV provide system models for substation and network architectures one and ten with detailed modeling. Section IV presents simulation results for all ten architectures and Section V concludes with recommendations for future research.
II. TEN ARCHITECTURES
Segregation of a substation network from others is a challenging task. In this section, an overview of ten common network architectures for industrial control systems is provided [21] , [22] . These architectures represent a subset of commonly deployed substations networks. The security posture of these architectures can be summarized as: 1) Case A: Architecture with only external boundary protection; 2) Case B: Architecture with external boundary protection and remote access; 3) Case C: Architecture with external and internal boundary protection. Case A describes architectures one, two, three, six, seven, and nine, while case B describes architectures four and five, and case C for architectures eight and ten.
1) Architecture One-Dual-Homed Computers:
This architecture shown in Fig. 1 consists of the installation of dual network interface cards (NICs) in a set of computers that lie between CN and SN. DHC can send and receive packets from both networks, but does not permit forwarding of packets directly from one network to the other. However, this architecture provides minimal network separation. An intruder could reconfigure the kernel on any of the dual-homed computers to permit the DHC to forward packets automatically from one network to the other. In such an attack, the main objective of network isolation is defeated. DHCs are widely viewed as convenient targets by hackers. Examples of DHCs include communications controllers for an energy-management system (EMS) and engineering workstations. Both sets of equipment are dual-ported. Communications controllers drive DNP3, IEC61850 MMS, or IEC60870-5-104 communications with substation equipment. Engineering workstations allow central engineering staff remote access to substation equipment. There are no firewalls in the substations. The DHCs are generally not configured to forward packets as would a router or firewall.
2) Architecture Two-Dual-Homed Server (DHS): This architecture is similar to the DHC architecture, but in this case, the network of DHCs is replaced by a single DHS. Usually, a host-based firewall is installed in such a server to control access to the server, but not to permit packets to be forwarded between the two networks. For example, a local substation historian server or a protocol conversion device can be dual-homed server since both of these examples require access to both networks. In this architecture, the DHS is positioned physically in the substation to protect substation equipment at the interface between the substation and the substation wide-area network (WAN). This setup is typical of vendors' offerings of "substation automation solution." In this architecture, there is generally a firewall at the interface between the corporate WAN and the substation WAN, but that firewall is generally configured to permit all communications from the EMS or corporate WAN out to the substation WAN. It is configured only to block returning communications from the substation WAN. In this architecture therefore, the firewall is effective only to protect the ESW and so is counted as part of the ESW component. This class of DHS equipment is generally not configured as a router or firewall, able to forward IP packets, though it may forward DNP3 or other protocol messages, or translated messages, if it is configured as a communications controller or protocol converter. This architecture reduces the attack surface for attackers wishing to reach the substation network, but is still generally regarded as poor security practice.
3) Architecture Three-Two-Port Firewall (FW): A simple two-port firewall between CN and SN can be a convenient solution for network segregation. Most commercial firewalls can inspect all TCP packets and act as proxy for common Internetbased protocols, such as FTP and HTTP [22] . If managed well, such firewalls can be successfully deployed to thwart most external attacks on SN. However, there is always data which must be transmitted from a substation to central EMS and other systems, and so these firewalls must always contain rules to allow such data transfer. One fundamental of vulnerability to all firewalls is that all widely used data-access protocols are bidirectional. That implies that malicious packets appearing to be poll requests or responses to queries can be forwarded to substation networks via these same firewall rules. While this type of firewall architecture conforms to security best practice, the required rule sets still represent a class of vulnerability which can be exploited by attackers.
4) Architecture Four-Dial-Up Access to RTUs: Dial-up modems (DUMs) are part of some SNs and allow remote field devices and technicians to communicate directly with RTUs and other devices in the substation. These modems usually work as backup pathways when primary communications fail.
Attackers can exploit this architecture by directly dialing the modems attached to the field devices. The attacker will dial every phone number looking for the modems. It is generally not difficult to find these modems since most RTUs identify themselves. The successful connection to the modem creates an alternative path for the attacker to reach the SN. This alternate path allows attackers to bypass firewalls and DMZs.
5) Architecture Five-Network With Vendor Support:
This architecture represents a direct communication pathway by vendors or service providers for system upgrades, patching, and maintenance of devices in the field. A dial-up modem is implemented. This differs from architecture four only since this limits the possible paths to the control networks.
6) Architecture Six-Firewall With the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ):
A DMZ between a CN and a SN can be a significant improvement in terms of the security of the SN. A DMZ creates an intermediate network between the two networks. A firewall in DMZ requires three or more interfaces. Each CN and SN is connected to a separate interface. The third interface is connected to a shared network hosting, for example, a substation automation server or communications controller. No direct communication is possible between CN and SN since all communication initiated from either of these networks ends in the DMZ. Firewall rules forbid direct communications from CN to SN networks and, therefore, allow clear separation of the two networks. However, it is still possible for attackers to compromise a host in the DMZ which would leave the CN and SN vulnerable to attack from the DMZ.
7) Architecture Seven-Paired Firewalls on Both Sides of a DMZ:
A DMZ can be made more secure with an additional firewall, positioning one firewall on each side of the DMZ. As in all DMZ architectures, the firewalls are configured to permit communications between the CN and servers in the DMZ, and between the SN and servers in the DMZ, but never between the CN and SN directly. [22] . Using two firewalls from two different vendors can enhance security, that is, a vulnerability discovered in the software of one vendor's firewall is unlikely to be present in both vendors' firewalls. 
8) Architecture Eight-Packet-Filtering Router/Layer-3
Switch: This type of architecture consists of a layer-3 Ethernet switch or router between CN and SN. Usually, this switch is capable of basic filters to control traffic. A number of such switches/routers work as basic packet filtering firewalls as well. These devices are capable of applying devices to device rule-sets [22] . However, they cannot prevent attacks that use packet fragmentation. This architecture offers minimal protection against sophisticated attackers and is only secure if the security of CN is well established.
9) Architecture Nine-Unidirectional Gateways: An alternate architecture uses a combination of unidirectional gateways as a means to segregate CN and SN. This architecture utilizes two sets of unidirectional transmitters (TX) and two sets of unidirectional receivers (RX) creating two separate DMZs, one for data moving from the SN to the CN, and another for data moving in the other direction. The physical design of the unidirectional TX and RX hardware prevents any backflow of data.
10) Architecture Ten-Network With VLAN:
The setups of the first nine architectures segregate the substation network as one isolated workgroup of computers. In architecture ten depicted in Fig. 2 , a substation network is divided into different VLANs where interarea communication is not required. Simple layer-3 Ethernet switches are used to control communication between VLANs. Within one VLAN, a layer-2 switch is used to control communication between devices. Architecture ten contains three separate VLANs, one each for IED, a local historian or substation automation server, and one or more local workstations.
Across all architectures, connections between a substation network and external networks are the common security perimeters. Within the substation network, four different topologies are considered: 1) star, 2) ring, 3) simple cascading, and 4) redundant cascading [23] . The compromise and remedy rates of individual components are used to calculate the overall intrusion resilience of each architecture. Typical substation components, such as human-machine interface (HMI), industrial personal computer (IPC), the network control center server (NCCS), Ethernet switch (ESW), Ethernet interface (EI), digital control panel (DCP), and optical fiber (OPT) are included in the substation topology [23] . Models for architectures one and ten are detailed with mathematical expressions for remedy rates, compromise rates, MTTC, probability of effectively intrusion detection and prevention, and the effectiveness of intrusion detection and prevention. The remaining topology block diagrams (TBD) for network architectures two-nine [24] are depicted in Fig. 7 . Topological models for architectures one and ten are compared.
The time to compromise is the duration required for attackers to gain unauthorized access from one layer to another across security perimeters. Time to compromise depends on the nature of vulnerabilities in targets of compromise, and the attackers' skill level. The mean interval between successful penetrations of an automation architecture is defined as the mean time to compromise (MTTC), which is conceptually similar to mean time to failure (MTTF) [20] . In this study, every compromised component is considered to be a successful intrusion to the next layer of security. The compromise rate is the number of times a device can be compromised in a day. It is estimated based on the attacker skill level and the number of vulnerabilities that exist in a component. As attackers' skill levels increase and as the number of vulnerabilities increase, the compromise rate also increases [25] , [26] . The remedy rate is defined as the number of devices which have already been compromised which can be blocked from further exploitation by the attackers in a given period of time. The definition of this term differs slightly from the definition of "recovery rate" which refers to the cyberforensics interval in addition to the component restoration time [27] . The remedy rate is proportional to the exploitation level as well as with security protection levels and with the information technology expertise of the enterprise. The intent of the proposed method is to evaluate MTTC of the entire system using compromise and remedy rates of individual devices. The evaluation is based on the assumption that outside attackers initiate intrusion attempts from the outermost layer of security protection, and that final destination is the digital control panel of the substation network. The topology block diagram of ten network architectures has been used as a high-level abstraction of attack paths. Since intrusion data and specific equipment vulnerability data for the substation automation network is considered sensitive, compromise and remedy rates corresponding to vulnerability levels for each component are reasonably estimated as in previous studies [20] , [26] , [27] .
III. EQUIVALENT RATES FOR SERIES/PARALLEL CONNECTION
In this section, a theoretical analysis of equivalent compromise and remedy rates is illustrated in series and parallel connectivity structures. In the context of intrusion-related attacks, the compromise rate is the rapidity function of a network component that is compromised by attackers, whereas the remedy rate is the rapidity function of a preventive or remedial step to block malicious users from employing compromised components.
A. Series Systems 1) Equivalent Compromise Rate:
Intruders target security boundaries within layered network architectures. The number of successful penetrations in a unit of time is the compromise rate. The compromise rate depends directly on the structure of the network and the attackers' strength. In this model, a series of connected system is considered entirely compromised when intruders can access all of the components in the series, from the beginning to the end of the network components in the series. Since each component needs minimum time to compromise, the amount of time to compromise the targeted device at the end of the series increases with the number of components connected in the series. The equivalent compromise rate of the series system will be smaller than the lowest compromise rate of any of the components. The equivalent compromise rate of a series system consists of two devices, having compromise rate and is defined as (1) 2) Equivalent Remedy Rate: A system is considered remedied if the intruders are blocked from using a targeted device. The remedy rate is defined as the number of devices which have already been compromised which can be blocked from further exploitation by the attackers in a given period of time. The equivalent remedy rate of a series of network devices is defined as the lowest remedy rate of the components connected in the series, indicating the minimum time required to block attackers from discovering additional information for the next level of penetration attempt. Thus, the equivalent remedy rate for a series block example consisting of two components is defined as (2) B. Parallel Systems 1) Equivalent Compromise Rate: In parallel systems, there are multiple attack pathways between two security layers which enable the attacker to choose the easiest path by which to reach the next intermediate target. The equivalent compromise rate of a system is defined as the highest rate of the components among all parallel-connected components. A compromise rate of a parallel system consisting of two devices with compromise rates and is defined as (3) 2) Equivalent Remedy Rate: Similarly, the remedy rate is defined as a responsive investigation to block a potentially compromised component in a parallel setting and is inversely related among all components in parallel. Thus, the equivalent remedy rate of a parallel system is (4) This implies that the resulting value of a parallel equivalent block would be the lowest rate among the original two, that is, and .
IV. MODEL FOR ARCHITECTURE ONE
The TBD shown in Fig. 1 is grouped for better illustration of parallel and serial components. The substation network is a star topology which is the same structure as architecture A. The abbreviation of architecture A, "archA," shown in Fig. 1 , refers to the first model of [23] . The other network is connected to the substation network by a network of DHCs. For simplicity, 1 is used throughout the rest of this paper. The following equations show the derivation of compromise and remedy rates for architecture one. Architecture one is divided into blocks G, H, J, and architecture A. Series combinations of these four structures form architecture one. First, compromise and remedy rates for each structure are calculated separately. For structure G, compromise and remedy rates are expressed as follows:
Structure H is divided into blocks H1 and H2. Compromise and remedy rates for H1 and H2 are expressed as follows: (7) (8) (9) (10) Now, the compromise and remedy rates for H are expressed in terms of those rates for H1 and H2 and are shown in the following equations: (11) (12) Blocks H1 and H2 represent the industrial personal computer (IPC) and the Ethernet interface (EI). Similarly, compromise and remedy rates for J, which represent the DHCs, are derived as follows: (13) (14) The remedy rate in this case is divided by two because two DHC components depicted in Fig. 1 are connected in parallel.
Structure A consists of blocks B, ESW, C, and DCP connected in series. Block B is divided into blocks B1 and B2. The compromise and remedy rate for B are expressed as follows:
Compromise and remedy rates for block C are as follows: (21) (22) Equivalent compromise and remedy rates of structure A are expressed in (24) , shown at the bottom of the page, and (25) The equivalent remedy rate of architecture one is the minimum rate of individual blocks of G, H, J, and architecture A (25) In the same way, the compromise rate of architecture one is expressed in terms of compromise rates of the four blocks in (26) , shown at the bottom of the page.
1) Mean Time to Compromise (MTTC):
The MTTC for architecture one is calculated as the reciprocal of the system compromise rate for architecture one as follows: (27) 2) Probability of Effective Intrusion Detection and Prevention (P): The probability of effective intrusion detection and prevention is calculated using compromise and remedy rates of architecture one shown by (28) [28] : (28) 
3) Effectiveness of Intrusion Detection and Prevention (EIDP):
The effectiveness of intrusion detection and prevention is the same as the probability of effective intrusion detection and prevention as shown [20] Remedy rates for U1, U3, and U are
The compromise rate of architecture ten is the equivalent rate of the five blocks G, H, T, U, and DCP depicted in Fig. 2 as given in (38), shown at the bottom of the page. The equivalent remedy rate of architecture ten is (39)
Mean Time to Compromise (MTTC):
The MTTC of architecture ten is the reciprocal of the total compromise rate .
Probability of Effective Intrusion Detection and Prevention (P):
The probability of effective intrusion detection and prevention for architecture ten is shown as (40)
Effectiveness of Intrusion Detection and Prevention (EIDP):
The effectiveness of intrusion detection and prevention of architecture ten is calculated as follows:
The measure of expected time to compromise (ETTC) of automation components from [20] is based on attackers' skills and the vulnerability levels of targeted equipment. These inputs are used to evaluate the effectiveness of intrusion detection and prevention, and MTTC of ten architectures. The compromise rate of a component in an architecture is assumed by taking the inverse of ETTC. Table I shows compromise and remedy rates for four levels of attackers' skills and vulnerabilities of the components. Higher vulnerability numbers represent relatively more/easier opportunities to gain access to or through a device. In addition, the compromise rate increases while the expertise level of an attacker improves. With the increase of attackers' skills, the strength of exploits used by the attackers increases, which would decrease the remedy rate on a specific component. Based on these assumptions, the adjustment of random values has been assigned within reasonable ranges for the remedy rates of components for the purpose of evaluation.
The effectiveness of intrusion detection and prevention of the ten architectures are presented in Fig. 3 where it can be observed that all architectures are relatively secure from being compromised by novice attackers. The EIDP of systems reduce with the increase of attacker skill level and show significantly lower EIDP for expert attackers. Fig. 3 shows that architecture nine is the most secure for any attacker expertise level. Most important, architecture nine is the most capable in detecting and preventing further compromise by expert attackers. A large number of series connection and fewer parallel paths enable architecture nine to perform better than any other architecture in a worst case attack. Architectures four, five, and ten reveal themselves as much less secure. Three parallel blocks in architecture ten and the parallel connection with the dial-up modem in architecture four and five introduce more attack paths in the communication network, dramatically reducing EIDP among those architectures.
The plots of MTTC for novice to expert attackers are shown in Fig. 4 . The figure shows that the MTTC reduces significantly in the case of an expert attacker. The higher compromise rate and lower remedy rate of the expert attacker cause the lower MTTC. However, architecture nine shows the highest MTTC. This is because the system-equivalent compromise rate is only influenced by the series structures of the network. Block Q, which contains two oppositely oriented unidirectional gateways deployed in parallel, is equivalent to a single serial block. This is because the RX and TX hardware components physically block traffic in the opposite direction, so an attacker seeking to penetrate block Q in either direction has only one choice of path through the block, rather than a choice of two paths for any conventional networking component. In addition, blocks Q1 and Q2 consist of four components connected in series including the unidirectional transmitter and receiver which result in a comparatively lower equivalent compromise rate for architecture nine.
Since MTTC is the reciprocal of the equivalent compromise rate of the system, architecture nine has a higher MTTC value compared with other architectures. The sensitivity analysis represented here determines how variations in compromise and remedy rates would affect the system resilience. Components compromise and remedy rates are simultaneously changed by multipliers of original rates to determine the sensitivity. The impact of such changes on EIDP of the system are determined based on the attackers' levels of expertise as shown in Table II . The first row and column of the table represent the multipliers of components with compromise rates and remedy rates, respectively. Table II shows that for a constant compromise rate, EIDP increases with the increment of multiples of component remedy rates as higher remedy rates cause faster recoveries. EIDP decreases with the increment of multiples of the original compromise rate. Higher compromise rates lead to higher equivalent rates which decrease the probability of effectiveness for intrusion detection and prevention.
Next, the sensitivity of remedy and compromise rates is simulated separately. In the first case, compromise rates are kept constant, varying only with the multipliers for remedy rates. In the second case, remedy rates are kept constant and compromise rates are varied. In both cases, the changes in EIDP of ten architectures are compared. Figs. 5 and 6 show the sensitivity of the EIDP of the ten architectures to the variations in component remedy and compromise rates, respectively. In Fig. 6 , EIDP increases with a higher remedy rate. At higher remedy rates, the EIDP that is shown reaches 100% as the compromise rate remains constant. With increasing attacker skills, EIDP decreases as compromise rates increase. In contrast, Fig. 5 illustrates that the EIDP decreases with increments of compromise rates while the remedy rate remains constant.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents an overview of ten substation network architectures and evaluates the architectures as to their effectiveness at intrusion prevention. The comparison method is an intrusion-based quantitative analysis of those architectures. The metrics are MTTC and EIDP, measuring the effects of compromise and remedy rates on each network architecture. This determines substation security issues which may benefit from additional security investments. Future work will include: 1) determination of the relationship between compromise and remedy impacts in cyberphysical systems; 2) component data extraction in substation networks for effectiveness evaluation; and 3) tradeoff studies comparing monitoring costs versus system enhancements with budgetary constraints.
APPENDIX A TBDS FOR ARCHITECTURES TWO TO NINE
Substation control automation is increasingly implemented with commercially available computers, operating systems, and IP-based communications technologies [22] . Firewalls, routers, computers, and DMZ networks are the most common technologies for network boundary protection, though unidirectional gateways are starting to be deployed as well. As illustrated in these architectures, the isolation of control network and other networks is largely brought about with firewall solutions. Fig. 7 shows the TBD of architectures two to nine in ascending order. Each architecture represents a way the communication system is set up [21] , [22] . Including architectures one and ten, all architectures offer different levels of strengths in terms of security protection, how the system can be managed, as well as the scalability of overall systems that can be upgraded.
